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The Queen (on the application of) The Countryside Alliance & others – and – (1) H.M. Attorney General (2) The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Respondent); and between: The Queen (on the application of) Frances Derwin & others – and – (1) H.M. Attorney General (2) The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Respondent), RSPCA (Intervener)

Pays/Territoire
Royaume-Uni
Type de cour
Autres
Date
Jui 23, 2006
Source
UNEP, InforMEA
Nom du tribunal
Court of Appeal
Siège de la cour
London
Juge
Brook
Buxton
Numéro de référence
[2006] EWCA Civ 817
Langue
Anglais
Sujet
Espèces sauvages et écosystèmes
Mot clé
Accord international-texte Équipement de chasse/méthodes de chasse Autorisation/permis de chasse Accord international-mise en oeuvre Droits de chasse Droits de l'homme
Résumé
This case concerned an issue that had been controversial in English public life for many years, and which reached its climax in the much-debated Hunting Act 2004 that prohibited the hunting with dogs of certain wild mammals. The hearing involved the determination of two full appeals. The “human rights” (HR) appeal was based upon the submission that the ban contained in the Hunting Act infringed a number of the Appellants’ rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The “European Community” (EC) appeal relied upon the submission that the ban infringed the Appellants’ rights under the free movement provisions of the EC Treaty. As a precondition to the determination of the two appeals in this case, the Court interpreted the objective of the Hunting Act as a composite one of reducing unnecessary suffering to wild mammals, together with the view that causing suffering for sport was unethical. The Appellants of the HR Appeal submitted that the ban infringed the Appellants’ rights under articles 8 ECHR, namely their right to respect for their personal autonomy, their culture/community/lifestyle, their home and their use of that home. In the Court’s view these submissions were based upon an over-wide definition of the ambit of article 8 and did not in fact raise any question of a failure to respect the Appellants’ rights to their private or family lives or their homes. The HR Appellants also submitted an infringement of article 11 based upon the fact that the ban allegedly prohibited the assembling of hunting meetings and prohibited, or interfered with, the freedom of association of persons in and around hunting. The Court held that the ban merely prohibited a particular activity that could be undertaken by an assembled group, but did not prohibit the assembly itself. Therefore it could not be said that the ban infringed article 11. Finally, the HR Appellants claimed that the ban had deprived them of their property rights, or had interfered with their peaceful enjoyment of those rights, in various ways. However, the Court took the view that the Appellants were relying upon interests which could not be said to be ‘property’ for the purposes of article 1 protocol 1. In respect of certain conceded infringements the Court concluded that these infringements were justified within the requirements of article 1 protocol 1, on the basis that the aim pursued by the Hunting Act was legitimate; that the ban was proportionate to the aim pursued; and that the passing of the ban was a permissible course of action for the State to take considering the significant margin of discretion accorded to it. The EC Appellants submitted that the ban fell within article 28 as being equivalent to a quantitative restriction upon imports of hunting-related goods into the UK from other member states. However, the Court held that article 28 was not wide enough to encompass the ban. The ban was a restriction which was not aimed at products from other member states, or at products at all, and did not have a discriminatory effect on imported products. The EC Appellants also submitted that the ban fell within article 49 on the basis that it restricted the freedom of providers, based in the UK, to provide hunting-related services to nationals of other member states. The Court took the view that, to engage article 49, a measure had to have a direct inhibiting effect on the free movement of services. It was not sufficient that the measure merely decreased the demand for a particular service within a member state. Such was the case with the Hunting Act; and therefore, article 49 was not engaged. The Court concluded by emphasizing that the alleged infringements of articles 28 and 49 would in any case be justified on the same grounds as in the HR appeal.
Texte intégral
countryside_v_attorney_0606.htm