Ministry of Defence v AB & Ors. Pays/Territoire Royaume-Uni Type de cour Nationale - cour supérieure Date Nov 22, 2010 Source UNEP, InforMEA Nom du tribunal Court of Appeal Siège de la cour London Juge SmithLevesonWaller. Numéro de référence [2010] EWCA Civ 1317 Langue Anglais Sujet Déchets et substances dangereuses, Questions juridiques Mot clé Santé publique Énergie nucléaire Substances dangereuses Pollution radioactive Radiation Responsabilité/indemnisation Résumé Personal injury claims issued three years after the date of knowledge are time barred pursuant to section 11 and 14 of the Limitation Act 1980. However, it is often assumed that where a fair trial can still go ahead, the Court will most likely dis-apply the three limitation period and exercise its discretion under section 33 of the same Act. The cogency of the evidence and the ability to defend a stale claim are the very important considerations when analysing the prejudice. However, careful consideration should be given to ‘all of the circumstances, including a broad assessment of the merits of the claim. The ‘Atomic Veterans Litigation (Ministry of Defence v AB and others [2010] EWCA Civ 1317) concerned injuries alleged to have been caused by atmospheric nuclear tests that took place in the Pacific between 1952 and 1958. Claims were issued by a group of 1,011 ex-servicemen who claimed to have suffered injury through exposure to radioactive fallout. The Ministry of Defence denied liability. Upon the making of a Group Litigation Order in favour of the Atomic Veterans, 10 lead cases were tried on limitation as a preliminary issue. The trial judge found in favour of the claimants in all 10 cases: five on the basis that the claimants did not have the relevant knowledge of the injury, for the purposes of s.14A, until less than 3 years before proceedings were commenced. The Court of Appeal held, in all but one of the five cases originally allowed to proceed under s.14A, that they were statute barred, as the claimants had relevant knowledge more than 3 years before the claims had been issued. On the question of what exactly constitutes knowledge, the Court of Appeal held that a claimant only needs enough knowledge for it to be reasonable to expect him to set about investigation. In this case the claimants sought to rely on the fact that they were awaiting the results of expert evidence as to the cause of their injuries before pursuing the claims. The Court of Appeal refused to allow them to do so, finding that time began to run for the purposes of s.14A when it was reasonable to the claimants to investigate, not when the result of that investigation was known. Consequently, the judge was wrong to exercise his discretion under section 33 because the Claimants prospects of establishing causation were hopeless. Texte intégral COU-156656.pdf