Environment Agency (Formerly National Rivers Authority) (Respondent) v. Empress Car Co. (Albertillery) Ltd. (Appellant) Pays/Territoire Royaume-Uni Type de cour Nationale - cour supérieure Date Fév 5, 1998 Source UNEP, InforMEA Nom du tribunal House of Lords Siège de la cour London Juge Lord Browne-WilkinsonLord Lloyd of BerwieckLord HoffmanLord Clyde Numéro de référence 2 WLR. 350 Langue Anglais Sujet Eau, Déchets et substances dangereuses Mot clé Lutte contre la pollution Normes de qualité de l'eau Responsabilité/indemnisation Substances dangereuses Résumé The appellant maintained a diesel tank in a yard which was drained directly into a river. The tank was surrounded by a bund to contain spillage, but the appellant had overridden that protection by fixing an extension pipe to the outlet of the tank so as to connect it to a drum standing outside the bund. The outlet from the tank was governed by a tap which had no lock. On 20 March 1995 the tap was opened by a person unknown and the entire contents ran into the drum, overflowed into the drum, overflowed into the yard and passed down the drain into the river. The appellant was charged with causing polluting matter to enter controlled waters contrary to section 85(1) of the Water Resources Act 1991. The justices convicted the appellant, and the Crown Court and the Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division dismissed an appeal against conviction. On appeal by the appellant, the House of Lords held that on a prosecution for causing pollution under section 85(1) of the Water Resources Act 1991 it was necessary to identify what the defendant was alleged to have done to cause the pollution. It decided that the prosecution did not need to prove that the defendant did something which was the immediate cause of the pollution. When the prosecution had identified some act done by the defendant the justices had to decide whether it caused the pollution. If a necessary additional condition of the actual escape was the act of a third party or a natural event, the justices should consider whether that act or event should be regarded as a matter of ordinary occurrence, which would not negative the effect of the defendant’s act, or something extraordinary, leaving open a finding that the defendant did not cause the pollution. The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary was one of the fact and degree to which the justices had to apply their commons sense of what occurred in the locality. The House of Lords held accordingly, applying the foregoing principles, that there was ample evidence on which the Crown Court had been entitled to find that the appellant had caused the Pollution. Texte intégral Nation.Deci._Vol_3=prelims.pdf Disponible en UNEP/UNDP/Dutch Government Joint Project on Environmental Law and Institutions in Africa, Compendium of Judicial Decisions on Matters related to Environment, National Decisions, Volume III, Page 220