The economics of environmental monitoring and enforcement Autor Russel C.S. (ed.) Fecha 2003 Fuente IUCN (ID: MON-073137) Editor | Lugar de publicación Ashgate Publishing | Aldershot, UK ISBN 0 7546 2196 0 Páginas 612 p. Tipo de documento Misceláneo Idioma Inglés Campo de aplicación Internacional Materia Medio ambiente gen. Palabra clave Monitoreo Autoregulación Cumplimiento/aplicación Resumen Selected contents: Optimality overall: (1) The economic theory of public enforcement of law The choice of policy instruments: (2) The economics of enforcing air pollution controls The design of penalties: (3) Guilty until proven innocent - Regulation with costly and limited enforcement Self-reporting discharges: (4) Self-reporting of pollution and the firm 's behavior under imperfectly enforceble regulations (5) Self-reporting and the design of policies for regulating stochastic pollution Stochastic of discharges and errors of inference in monitoring: (6) Firm behavior under regulatory control of stochastic environmental wastes by probabilistic constraints Using ex-post liability: (7) Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control Using the regulatory record: (8) An integrated strategy to reduce monitoring and enforcement costs Private and voluntary approaches: (9) Public mechanisms to support compliance to an environmental norm (10) Private enforcement of federal environmental law Describing the M&E situation in the US: (11)Environmental crime and punishment: Legal / economic theory and empirical evidence on enforcement of federal environmental statutes Do monitoring and enforcement efforts make a difference? (12) Effectiveness of the EPA 's regulatory enforcement: The case of industrial effluent standards Cost and benefits of monitoring and enforcement: (13) The costs and benefits of oil spill prevention and enforcement Explaining the behaviour of enforcement agencies: (14) Standard setting with incomplete enforcement revisited