Forestry Commission of New South Wales v. Corkill País/Territorio Australia Tipo de la corte Nacional - corte superior Fecha Nov 1, 1991 Fuente UNEP, InforMEA Nombre del tribunal Supreme Court of New South Wales Juez MahoneyMeagherHandley Número de referencia 73 LGRA Idioma Inglés Materia Bosques, Especies silvestres y ecosistemas Palabra clave Ordenación forestal/conservación de montes Autorización/permiso Licencia/permiso forestal Especies animales protegidas Resumen The Forestry Commission of New South Wales proposed to carry out a programme of logging in the Chaelundi State Forest. It was common ground that the result of carrying out that logging would be the disturbing or killing of protected fauna. The issue to be determined was whether that would involve a contravention of s 98 or s 99 of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW). Mr. Corkill had brought proceedings in the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales in respect of the proposal. That court had declared that the proposal, if carried out by logging and roading activities, would be “likely to disturb or injure” various endangered species within the Act. The Commission had appealed to this Court against that declaration. The Supreme Court affirmed that protected fauna would be disturbed and/or killed. That was accepted to be the unintended but necessary result of the carrying out of the logging proposal. The court then analyzed whether this would result in breaches of s 98 or s 99 of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974. In the opinion of the court, both s 98 and s 99 applied to the Commission’s proposal. Section 98 related to protected fauna that was not endangered. A person who took or killed protected fauna within s 98 was not liable to conviction for an offence against that section if he proved “that the act constituting the offence was done… in pursuance of a duty imposed on him by or under any Act” (s 98(3)(b)). The duty imposed upon logging companies by the relevant licenses was, in the court’s view, a duty imposed by or under the Forestry Act and therefore the killing protected fauna within s 98 would not give rise to a conviction for an offence. The position was, however, different in respect of s 99. Section 99 related to protected fauna that was additionally endangered. Section 99(3) provided that where the provisions of an Act “authorize or require anything to be done that would constitute an offence” under s 99(1), “the provisions of this section prevail.” That meant that, notwithstanding that what was done may have been done pursuant to another Act, the taking or killing of endangered fauna would constitute an offence under s 99. Therefore, the proposal by the Forestry Commission would involve, at least, the commission of an offence by the logging companies under s 99. The appeal was dismissed. Texto completo COU-143777E.pdf Referencias Cited by Leatch v. National Parks and Wildlife Service and Shoalhaven City Council Jurisprudencia | Otros | Australia | Nov 23, 1993 Palabra clave: EIA, Principio de cautela, Especies animales protegidas Fuente: UNEP, InforMEA