F. Dale Robertson, Chief, United States Forest Service, et al., Petitioners v. Seattle Audubon Society et al. País/Territorio Estados Unidos de América Tipo de la corte Nacional - corte superior Fecha Mar 25, 1992 Fuente UNEP, InforMEA Nombre del tribunal Supreme Court of the United States Sede de la corte Washington D.C. Juez Thomas Número de referencia 503 U.S. 429 (1992) Idioma Inglés Materia Cuestiones jurídicas, Especies silvestres y ecosistemas Palabra clave Madera Procedimientos judiciales/procedimientos administrativos Especies en peligro Resumen This case arose out of two challenges to the Federal Government’s efforts to allow the harvesting and sale of timber from certain old growth forests that were home to the northern spotted owl, a threatened bird. There were conflicting interests to conserve the owl on the one side and to support the local timber industry on the other side. The question the court had to answer was whether a Congress Act related to the management of the old growth forest was purporting to direct results in two pending cases. The Respondents were environmental groups that filed lawsuits challenging proposed timber harvesting in the forests in question. In response to this ongoing litigation, Congress enacted § 318 of the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990. Section 318 both required harvesting and expanded harvesting restrictions. Subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) prohibited harvesting altogether in various designated areas, and subsection (b)(6)(A) stated in part that "Congress hereby determines and directs that management of the forests according to subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) . . . is adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for the two cases," which were identified by name and caption number. The respondents claimed that subsection (b)(6)(A) violated Article III by purporting to direct results in two pending cases. The Supreme Court held that subsection (b)(6)(A) did not violate Article III. It was of the view that the provision compelled changes in law, not results under old law, by replacing the legal standards underlying the two original cases with those set forth in subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5). Before its enactment, respondents’ claims would fail only if the challenged harvesting violated none of the provisions of the five statutes that formed the basis for the original lawsuits. Under subsection (b)(6)(A), however, the claims would fail if the harvesting satisfied both of two new provisions. Thus, subsection (b)(6)(A)’s operation modified the old provisions. Moreover, there was nothing in the subsection that purported to direct any particular findings of fact or applications of law to fact. Section 318 reserved judgment on the lawfulness of the timber sales under old law. It did not instruct the courts whether any particular timber sales would violate subsections (b)(3) or (b)(5). Texto completo 90-1596.ZO.html Referencias Cites Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill et al. Jurisprudencia | Nacional - corte superior | Estados Unidos de América | Jun 15, 1978 Palabra clave: Especies en peligro, Presa, Economiá y medio ambiente Fuente: UNEP, InforMEA