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Cottage Industries Exposition Ltd. And Anr. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors.

Country/Territory
India
Type of court
National - higher court
Date
Sep 3, 2007
Source
UNEP, InforMEA
Court name
High Court of Delhi
Seat of court
New Delhi
Judge
Mudgal, M.
Bhasin, P.
Reference number
2007 (122) ECC 7, 2007 (148) ECR 7 Delhi
Language
English
Subject
Wild species & ecosystems
Keyword
Offences/penalties Wildlife products Protected plant species Protected animal species Protected fish species Enforcement/compliance Protection of species
Abstract
This writ petition challenges the criminal proceedings initiated by the officers of the Customs under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 and by the officers of the Wildlife Department under the provisions of Wildlife Protection Act, 1972 and seizure of 12 pieces of shawls, suspected to be made of 'Shahtoosh wool'. The export of shahtoosh shawls is prohibited as it falls under the 'Negative List' of the export of Exim Policy 1992-97. The main issue involved in this writ petition arises from a plea of the petitioner that the 'hair' of the animal Chiru does not form or part of an animal article as defined in Section 2(2) of the Act and hence the user of such 'hair' in producing the Shahtoosh shawls was not hit by the bar prescribed under Section 49(B) of the Act. The principal plea of petitioner that 'hair' is not part of the definition of animal article, is postulated on the premise that the fact that 'hair' has been included within the definition of 'trophy' clearly shows that it was not intended by the legislature to be included in the definition of animal article. It is necessary to look at the preamble of the Act which, as amended by Act 28 of 1986, in the Statement of objects and Reasons declares: The Wild Life (Protection) Act 28 of 1972 provides for protection of wild animal, birds and plants and for matters connected therewith or ancillary or incidental thereto with a view to ensuring the ecological and environmental security of the country. The intention of the Parliament while enacting the provisions contained in the Chapter 5A, regulating trade or commerce in wild animals, animal articles and trophies within the country, was to impose a complete prohibition on manufacture and trade in Scheduled animal articles. If the intention of the Parliament would have been to exclude naturally shed animal parts such as hair it would have specifically excluded such parts from the definition of uncured trophy, trophy or scheduled animal article. The Parliament not having done so clearly implies that the legislative intent was that an article made from the 'hair' of a Scheduled animal fell within the meaning of the 'Scheduled animal article' as defined in Section 49A(b) of the Wildlife Protection Act and the manufacture or trading of such an article is completely prohibited under Section 49. Thus when the legislative intent is clearly discernible and indicates that trading in wild animals specified in aforesaid schedule or any derivative from such animals were to be forbidden from being traded, it cannot be contended logically that 'hair' is not a derivative from such animal. Nothing in the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the list of the Act indicates that 'animal article' should not be given its plain grammatical meaning. It is also not in dispute that wild animal 'Chiru' falls in Part I Schedule I of the Act and thus it is clear that legislature clearly intended that trading in wild animals and derivatives there from is clearly prohibited. It is aptly clear from various judgments of the Supreme Court that statutory provision must be so construed, so that not only absurdity and mischief is avoided but the words used by the legislature are given their plain and grammatical meaning. A rule of construction should be preferred which advances the purpose and object of legislation. Though a construction, according to plain language, should ordinarily be adopted, such a construction should not be adopted where it leads to anomalies, injustices or absurdities. The Tibetan Antelope is listed, as an endangered species under the authority of Endangered Species Act, and has also been provided the highest protection under the convention on international trade in endangered species, under Appendix I of the said convention. Thus, any intention to exclude the products derived from the said animal or any part of the said animal from the definition of 'animal article' would not only defeat the purpose and intent of the legislature but would run contrary to the international concern expressed through the international legislation on the aforesaid subject. Therefore the Court finds no merit in the pleas advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The writ petition is dismissed accordingly.
Full text
COU-156221.pdf
Website
www.indiankanoon.org